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Why Logic, Experience, and Precedent 
Compel the Demise of Mandatory 
Sentencing Statutes 
William Wray Jr.∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
My comment begins with an uncontroversial maxim: “Let the 
punishment fit the crime.”1 From that modest beginning it 
alternately crawls, leaps, and shuffles towards its brassy 
conclusion: in order that the punishments better fit the crime, 
sentencing discretion should be vested in judges, and mandatory 
sentencing statutes should be abolished. Mandatory sentencing 
statutes needlessly inject complex heuristics into a decision that 
may be made equally as well—if not better—from the judge’s 
bench. 
Though loathe to suggest that the strength of an argument 
depends on the author’s perspective, I note that I would describe 
neither myself nor this argument as “pro-Defendant” or “pro-
Prosecution.” If mandatory sentencing statutes are abolished, the 
net effect may be to decrease the aggregate length of criminal 
sentences. Or the net effect might be an increase in the aggregate 
length of criminal sentences. My argument is merely that if 
 
∗ Lord of Sealand, candidate for Juris Doctor. I’d like to thank Nick Nybo and 
the other editors of this article, and my family. To the extent that this shabby 
note can support a dedication, it is dedicated to Thanh Van Tran and Robert 
O. Wray Sr., two men who emerged from war-torn Vietnam to share enduring 
principles for a happy and fulfilling life.  
 1.   This maxim was popularized by W.S. Gilbert in his 1885 opera the 
“Mikado.” W.S. GILBERT & A. SULLIVAN, MY OBJECT ALL SUBLIME, IN A 
TREASURY OF GILBERT AND SULLIVAN 284 (Simon & Schuster eds. 1941) 
[hereinafter GILBERT, MY OBJECT ALL SUBLIME]. 
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mandatory sentencing statutes are abolished, sentences will more 
precisely reflect the culpability of the defendant. If this is not an 
outright improvement for both groups, it is at least a Pareto 
improvement. 
Throughout this comment, I will use the term “rounding 
error” to describe a flaw that I believe is common in mandatory 
sentencing statutes. In brief, if Alice, Bobby, and Carol are 
convicted of the same crime and receive the same sentence 
although they deserve different sentences based on facts not 
accounted for in the sentencing statute, then the statute has 
committed a “rounding error.” Bobby is the type of criminal 
contemplated by the drafters of the mandatory sentencing statute 
and receives the mandatory, and appropriate, sentence of eight 
years. Alice’s crime, however, involved aggravating factors not 
accounted for in the statute and deserved a sentence of ten years 
instead of the eight she ultimate receives. Carol’s crime involved 
mitigating factors not accounted for in the statute, and deserved a 
sentence of seven years. The “rounding error” in Alice’s case is two 
years and in Carol’s case, one year. Rather than calculate the 
sentence based on Alice, Bob, and Carol’s individual culpability, 
the statute has “rounded” three factually different crimes into one 
crime. 
Part I lists a series of rounding errors which illustrate how 
mandatory sentencing statutes are flawed. Part II discusses the 
federal Armed Career Criminal Act as an example which neatly 
illustrates almost all of the flaws described in Part I. Part III slips 
the surly bonds of empiricism and offers a rationalist argument 
that vesting sentencing discretion in judges (or juries) better 
serves each of the four Supreme Court-approved goals justifying 
penal sanctions (retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation). Part IV summarizes Supreme Court jurisprudence 
regarding the individualization of sentencing determinations, and 
suggests that the Court is nudging the states towards adopting 
individualized sentencing determinations. Though the Supreme 
Court has stated that in most cases “individualizing sentencing 
determinations . . . [is] simply enlightened policy rather than a 
constitutional imperative,”2 a string of recent cases suggest that it 
may have had its fingers crossed. And since the Court has 
 
 2.  Woodson v. N. Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). 
WRAY DESKTOPPED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2013  4:23 PM 
2013] MANDATORY SENTENCING STATUTES 141 
departed from an originalist reading of the Eighth Amendment,3 
the would-be limiting principle to these cases is society’s limitless 
“evolving standards of decency.”4  Part V addresses some of the 
counter-arguments to the thesis that judges are better sentencers 
than statutes, and suggests that the experience of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and empirical studies indicate that these 
objections are unfounded. 
PART I.  FLAWS OF MANDATORY SENTENCING STATUTES 
Mandatory sentencing statutes exhibit some of the following 
flaws: 
(1)  They are underinclusive. Though legislators intended to 
sanction violent criminals, in their attempts to draft the statute so 
as not to be overinclusive, violent criminals in fact escape the 
sanction.5 
(2)  They are overinclusive. Though the drafters may have 
intended to sanction only violent criminals, non-violent criminals 
are in fact sanctioned.6 
(3)  They omit relevant mitigating and aggravating factors. 
Though mandatory sentencing statutes may include mitigating 
and aggravating factors, (youth, criminal record, etc.), sometimes 
relevant factors are omitted7 or calculated too rigidly. 
(4)   They are cumbersome to apply.8 
(5) They are wasteful. The “cumbrous and expensive”9 
machinery of the state is set in motion to determine whether a 
given defendant is guilty. In the process, details relevant to the 
culpability of the defendant are learned by the judge and the jury. 
Yet mandatory sentencing schemes, which by necessity lump 
 
 3.  See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2040 (2010). 
 4.  Id. at 2024. 
 5.  See infra Part II. 
 6.  See infra Part II.  
 7.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Norris, 378 S.W.3d 103 (Ark. 2011) (addressing 
“the mandatory sentencing of children fourteen years of age and younger to 
life without the possibility of parole.”), rev’d sub nom. Miller v. Alabama, 132 
S. Ct. 2455 (2012). Notably, in Jackson v. Norris, the fact that the criminal 
was 14-years-old was irrelevant to his sentence as the Arkansas Supreme 
Court refused “to extend the Court’s bans to homicide cases involving a 
juvenile where the death penalty is not an issue.” Id. at 106. 
 8.  See infra Part II. 
 9.  O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 96 (1881).  
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disparate defendants into broader categories, “waste” these 
valuable facts by ignoring them. 
(6)  They are either useless or unjust, depending on the range 
of sentences provided. Much like price floors and price ceilings, if 
the mandatory sentencing scheme sets a range which is broad 
enough to allow a sentencing judge to consider every possible 
mitigating or aggravating factor, whether or not included in the 
statute, then they do not constrain judges. If the statute sets a 
narrower range such that a judge may not hand down different 
sentences to defendants who, though categorized identically, 
exhibit different levels of culpability, then they are unjust. 
PART II.  THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT. 
Though examples of mandatory sentencing statutes abound, I 
have chosen the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) as 
illustrative of several issues with mandatory sentencing schemes. 
The portion of the Armed Career Criminal Act discussed 
herein mandates a minimum sentence of imprisonment of fifteen 
years for “armed career criminals,”10 or, more precisely, those who 
have violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (which criminalizes the 
possession of firearms by felons) 11 and have a criminal record 
consisting of three or more violent felonies. 
So far, this sounds dandy. The title “Armed Career Criminal 
Act” and its statutory text evoke a common-sense story: a criminal 
with a prior violent felony record is caught with a gun; since he is 
an armed career criminal, he should receive a mandatory boost to 
his sentence relative to non-armed and/or non-career criminals. 
(Of course, even if the ACCA were abolished, a defendant’s 
criminal history would bear directly on the length of the 
sentence.)12 
A nit-picker might harvest his first nit from the term “armed 
career criminal.” Though there is a sort of surface logic in the 
term—one has to be both armed and a career criminal—the label 
obscures the fact that the two adjectives may have been earned 
disjunctively. An eighteen-year old boy—let’s call him Sue—may 
 
 10.  THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL., FED. SENTENCING L. & PRAC. § 4B1.4 
(2012 ed.) [hereinafter FED. SENTENCING L. & PRAC.].   
 11.  18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006) (hence “career criminals”). 
 12.   FED. SENTENCING L. & PRAC., supra note 10, at §5A (charting the 
effect of a defendant’s criminal history on a putative federal sentence).   
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amass before his twenty-second birthday a record of three 
felonious assault and battery convictions (Bar fights. Sue was 
inexplicably touchy.). He is now and always will be a “career 
criminal” according to 924(e)(1) of the ACCA.13 If, after a saintly 
forty years, Sue buys a hunting rifle in Tennessee and is caught as 
he drives into Arkansas, he is now an “armed career criminal.” 
But Sue was not armed for the qualifying felonies; Sue’s career 
was not necessarily criminal. 
The ACCA’s flaws are not simply semantic; it exhibits many 
of the wasteful, unjust mechanisms that taint mandatory 
sentencing schemes. The seat of these defects is its definition of a 
violent felony, which itself informs who is an armed career 
criminal. An armed career criminal is “a person who . . . has three 
previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of 
this title for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.”14 A violent 
felony is a crime that 
[1] has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against . . . another, 
[2] . . . is burglary, arson, or extortion, [or] involves use of 
explosives . . . or [3] otherwise involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.15 
Condition 1 is called the “Force Clause.” Condition 2 has no 
pithy name – I will call it the “Enumerated Felonies Clause.” 
Condition 3 is called the “Residual Clause.” 
A. The Force Clause: Violently Underinclusive 
Force Clause analysis of a given crime presents to judges an 
abstract question,  “Is battery violent?”, rather than “Was the 
battery committed by John Smith on December 1st violent?”16 As 
a result, though 99% of battery convictions may be based on 
violent behavior, battery may not qualify as a violent felony under 
the Force Clause. Judges are barred from utilizing police reports, 
complaint applications, etc. to flesh out details germane to 
violence vel non because they are “generally limited to examining 
 
 13.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006).  
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).  
 16.  Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1273 (2010).  
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the statutory definition, charging document, written plea 
agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual 
finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.”17 
Judges must assume a categorical approach to a crime: if there is 
but one way that the given crime may be committed non-violently, 
then the entire crime is ‘not violent’ under the Force Clause.18 
Thus is the Force Clause underinclusive. In Johnson v. United 
States, the Supreme Court was obliged to determine whether 
Florida battery constituted a violent felony under the Force 
Clause of the ACCA19 (When analyzing what the elements of a 
given crime are, federal courts are to refer to state law 
constructions of the crime.)20 
In Florida, one may be convicted of battery whenever “the 
element of actually and intentionally touching [is satisfied],” and 
“any intentional physical contact, no matter how slight,” satisfies 
the requirement.21 By contrast, the ACCA definition of physical 
force—a matter of federal law22—is “violent force-that is, force 
capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.”23 
Since, in Florida, “[t]he most nominal contact, such as a ta[p] . . . 
on the shoulder without consent, establishes a violation,” the 
crime of battery in Florida is not a violent felony under the Force 
Clause.24 
It may well be that 99% of batteries committed in Florida 
involve the use of “violent force.” But because judges—in the 
absence of documents which detail a specific instance of a crime—
are obliged to deem a crime non-violent because there is 
theoretically a way to commit the crime without violent force, then 
individuals who have committed violent felonies escape the 
ACCA’s sentencing enhancement. 
B. The Enumerated Felonies 
The first clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(b)(ii) simply lists some 
 
 17.  Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005). 
 18.  See, e.g., Johnson, 130 S. Ct.  at 1266.  
 19.  Id. at 1269.  
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 1269-70 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 22.  Id. at 1267. 
 23.  Id. at 1271. 
 24.  Id. at 1270 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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per se violent felonies, “burglary, arson, or extortion, [or a crime 
that] involves use of explosives.” This is both under and 
overinclusive. Because all of the enumerated crimes could be 
committed non-violently, particularly extortion, this clause is 
overinclusive. In Iowa, one may be convicted of extortion if one so 
little as “[t]hreatens to expose any person to hatred, contempt, or 
ridicule.”25 Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit recently confirmed 
that a conviction of extortion counts as a violent felony for the 
purpose of the sentencing guidelines.26 
The underinclusiveness of the enumerated felonies clause 
stems from the Supreme Court’s holding in Taylor v. United 
States.27 The Court analyzed the legislative history of ACCA and 
determined that when the enumerated felonies were listed, 
Congress did not contemplate that any state conviction which 
happened to be labeled burglary is necessarily a violent offense; 
instead, Congress intended for the “modern ‘generic’ view” of the 
crime to be counted as a violent felony.28 Thus, in order for a state 
conviction for one of the enumerated crimes to count as a violent 
felony, it must both 1) require the jury to find all of the elements 
of the crime of “generic” burglary, and 2) not criminalize a wider, 
less culpable range of conduct than that which the generic offense 
entails.29 The Court held that the defendant’s conviction of 
burglary in Missouri could not be counted as a violent felony, 
because “most but not all the . . . Missouri statutes defining 
second-degree burglary include all the elements of generic 
burglary. . . . [I]t is not apparent to us from the sparse record 
before us which of those statutes were the bases for Taylor’s prior 
convictions.”30 Illustrative of the second requirement is 
California’s burglary statute: the Supreme Court suggested in 
dicta that because “California defines ‘burglary’ so broadly as to 
 
 25.  IOWA CODE ANN. § 711.4 (West 2007). 
 26.  United States v. Malloy, 614 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied sub nom. Kluge v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 3023 (2011). Note that 
this decision was in fact addressing the definition of a violent felony under 
the “career offender” portion of sentencing enhancements, though the 
language of § 924(e)(2)(b)(ii) and § 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines is substantially identical. Malloy, 614 F.3d at 856-57.  
 27.  495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
 28.  Id. at 589. 
 29.  See id. at 602. 
 30.  Id.  
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include shoplifting and theft of goods from a ‘locked’ but 
unoccupied automobile,”31 a conviction of burglary in California 
would not count as a violent felony under the ACCA. Whether one 
is chagrined that a bevy of burglars escape sentencing 
enhancement or delighted that shoplifters are off the hook is a 
matter of penological taste. Either way, a more precise result 
obtains from a judge’s discretion, rather than a statute’s blind 
groping. 
C. The Residual Clause 
The Residual Clause theoretically tightens up the 
underinclusiveness of the Force Clause. A crime qualifies as a 
violent felony if it “otherwise involves conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another[.]”32 Justice 
Breyer explains that the Residual Clause of the ACCA is meant to 
cover crimes which are “typically committed by those whom one 
normally labels armed career criminals . . . [it targets behavior 
that] show[s] an increased likelihood that the offender is the kind 
of person who might deliberately point the gun and pull the 
trigger.”33 Thus the fact that “battery” may not qualify as a violent 
felony under the Force Clause does not necessarily foreclose the 
possibility of it qualifying as such under the Residual Clause.34 
The Residual Clause’s meaning is informed by the enumerated 
felonies – in the text of the statute, the two are within the same 
sentence. 
Many an ink cartridge has coughed out its last word in a vain 
effort to bring some semblance of regularity or principle to the 
application of the Residual Clause. Four times since 2007 has the 
Supreme Court addressed the question of “what is a violent 
felony”35 under this clause, and four interrelated tests—all of 
 
 31.  Id. at 591 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West 2010) and United 
States v. Chatman, 869 F.2d 525, 528-529, & n.2 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
 32.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 33.  Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146 (2008). 
 34.  In Johnson v. United States, discussed supra at page 6, the Supreme 
Court neither considered the issue of whether Florida battery qualified under 
the Residual Clause nor remanded for consideration of the issue because the 
Government “disclaimed at sentencing any reliance upon [it.]” 130 S. Ct. 
1265, 1274 (2010). 
 35.  See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011); Chambers v. 
United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009); Begay, 553 U.S. at 137; James v. United 
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which remain good law—have emerged.36 The fault may not lie 
entirely with the drafters of the ACCA. It would have taken a 
particularly perspicacious legislator to foresee the results of two 
subsequent Supreme Court cases which would render Residual 
Clause analysis, like Force Clause analysis, a categorical  
inquiry.37 Concurring with the Court in an opinion which held 
that failure-to-report was not a violent felony, Justice Alito wrote 
that: 
In 1986, when Congress enacted ACCA’s Residual 
Clause . . . Congress may have assumed that [ACCA] . . . 
would . . . require federal sentencing judges to determine 
whether the particular facts of a particular case [that is, 
the career criminal’s three prior convictions] triggered a 
mandatory minimum sentence. But history took a 
different track. [The] Court held that ACCA requires the 
sentencing court to look only to the fact that the 
defendant had been convicted of crimes falling within 
certain categories, and not to the facts underlying the 
prior convictions.38 
The Supreme Court kicked off its most recent “ACCA-thon” in 
2007 with James v. United States, which discussed whether a 
conviction for attempted burglary in Florida constituted a violent 
crime.39 There the Court explained that a crime qualifies as a 
violent felony if, in the typical case, the commission of the crime 
creates a degree of risk “comparable to that posed by its closest 
analog among the enumerated offenses.”40 The Court found that 
 
States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007).  
 36.  See U.S. v. Oliveira, 798 F. Supp. 2d 319, 329 (D. Mass. 2011) 
(“Importantly, Sykes did not overrule any of the previous [cases], and James, 
Begay, and Chambers remain good law.”).   
 37.  See James, 550 U.S. at 202 (“[W]e employ the categorical approach . . 
. .  Under this approach, we look only to the fact of conviction and the 
statutory definition of the prior offense, and do not generally consider the 
particular facts disclosed by the record of conviction.  That is, we consider 
whether the elements of the offense are of the type that would justify its 
inclusion within the residual provision, without inquiring into the specific 
conduct of this particular offender.”) (internal quotation marks and  citations 
omitted); see also Taylor v.  United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599–602 (1990). 
 38.  Chambers, 555 U.S. at 132 (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
 39.  550 U.S. at 192. 
 40.  Id. at 203. 
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the closest analog to attempted burglary was burglary, and 
decided that attempted burglary was a violent felony because, like 
the enumerated offenses, it “create[s] significant risks of bodily 
injury to others, or of violent confrontation that could lead to such 
injury.”41 
The 2007 James decision was closely followed by 2008’s 
Begay, which analyzed whether the New Mexico offense of driving 
under the influence (“DUI”) qualified as a violent felony under the 
ACCA’s Residual Clause.42 The Tenth Circuit answered in the 
affirmative, because drunk driving has a similar degree of risk of 
harm to the enumerated felonies.43 The Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded, distinguishing the DUI offense from the 
enumerated felonies in that DUI offenders do not exhibit 
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.”44 It may have 
seemed, at the time, that this decision simply narrows James’ 
scope – not only must a crime create significant risks of bodily 
injury or violent confrontation, the underlying conduct must also 
be purposeful, violent, and aggressive. As the discussion of Sykes 
v. United States below indicates, however, that interpretation 
evidently “overreads” Begay.45 
In 2009, the Supreme Court was again called upon to apply 
Residual Clause analysis in Chambers v. United States.46 There 
they held that a prior conviction of failing to report for court-
ordered detention did not qualify as a violent felony, though both 
the District Court and the Seventh Circuit (in an opinion by Judge 
Posner)47 had decided the opposite. The Court noted that the 
statute under which the defendant was convicted covered two 
separate crimes – failure to report for detention, and escape from 
a penal institution coupled with failure to report.48 Both the 
 
 41.  Id. at 193. 
 42.  Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008). 
 43.  Id. at 140. 
 44.  Id. at 144 (internal quotations omitted). 
 45.  Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2275 (2011) (“In 
[petitioner’s] view this Court's decisions in Begay and Chambers require 
ACCA predicates to be purposeful, violent, and aggressive in ways that 
vehicle flight is not. Sykes, in taking this position, overreads the opinions of 
this Court.”). 
 46.  555 U.S. 122 (2009). 
 47.  United States v. Chambers, 473 F.3d 724, 725 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 48.  Chambers, 555 U.S. at 122.  
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District Court and the Seventh Circuit had decided as they did 
base on the “escape” behavior encompassed by the statute.49 The 
critical factor for the Supreme Court, however, was that the crime 
did not “involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another.”50 This determination was in part 
based upon a study which purported to demonstrate the 
correlation vel non between convictions for escape and probability 
that violence would accompany the crime.51 
The Supreme Court’s latest decision applying the ACCA’s 
Residual Clause was Sykes v. United States, decided on June 9, 
2011, which held that a violation of Indiana’s felony vehicle flight 
statute constituted a violent felony.52 After explaining that 
felonious vehicle flight did not qualify as a violent felony either 
under the Force Clause53 or the enumerated felonies, Justice 
Kennedy valiantly attempts to summarize the methodology 
underlying Residual Clause analysis: 
The sole decision of this Court concerning the reach of 
ACCA’s residual clause in which risk was not the 
dispositive factor is Begay, which held that driving under 
the influence (DUI) is not an ACCA predicate[, because it 
is] not purposeful, violent, and aggressive. . . . [DUI was] 
analogiz[ed] to strict-liability, negligence, and 
recklessness crimes. . . . The phrase ‘purposeful, violent, 
and aggressive’ has no precise textual link to the residual 
clause. . . . In many cases the purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive inquiry will be redundant with the inquiry 
into risk, for crimes that fall within the former 
formulation and those that present serious potential risks 
of physical injury to others tend to be one and the same. 
As between the two inquiries, risk levels provide a 
categorical and manageable standard that suffices to 
 
 49.  Chambers, 473 F.3d at 727.  
 50.  Chambers, 555 U.S. at 128 (internal citations omitted).  
 51.  Id. at 129 (“The [Report on Federal Escape Offenses in Fiscal Years 
2006 and 2007] identifies every federal case in 2006 or 2007 in which a 
federal sentencing court applied the Sentencing Guideline. . . and in which 
sufficient detail was provided, say, in the presentence report, about the 
circumstances of the crime to permit analysis.”). 
 52.  131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011). 
 53.  Id. at 2275. 
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resolve the case before us.54 
Though the Court quoted James’ articulation that a crime is a 
violent felony when the degree of risk posed by the crime is 
“comparable to that posed by its closest analog among the 
enumerated offenses,”55 it did not identify a closest analog for the 
crime of vehicle flight. Instead the Court decided that vehicle 
flight was a violent felony because it is at least as risky as arson 
or burglary.56 
The petitioner had partially relied upon Begay, suggesting 
that it set a substantive requirement that ACCA predicate crimes 
had to be purposeful, violent, and aggressive.57 The Court 
demurred and suggested that the key distinction was that DUI 
was a type of strict liability or negligence crime, whereas the 
statute in question had a mens rea requirement of purposeful or 
knowing.58 Again, the Court relied upon a statistical record – this 
time suggesting that felonious vehicle flight was correlated 
strongly with violence – in its determination that it was a violent 
felony. 
Justice Scalia dissented and opined that the ACCA should be 
declared void for vagueness.59 Justice Scalia wrote that “[t]he 
residual-clause series will be endless, and we will be doing ad hoc 
application of ACCA to the vast variety of state criminal offenses 
until the cows come home.”60 Justice Scalia found some merit in 
the petitioner’s argument that felonious vehicle flight is neither 
violent nor aggressive, and thus should not qualify as a violent 
felony: “If the test excluded only [certain] unintentional crimes, it 
would be recast as the ‘purposeful’ test, since the last two 
adjectives (‘violent, and aggressive’) would do no work.”61  The 
Supreme Court has not issued another decision clarifying the 
application of the Residual Clause of ACCA, though not for lack of 
petitioners. 
 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. at 2275. 
 56.  Id. at 2273-75. 
 57.  Id. at 2275. 
 58.  See IND. CODE ANN. § 35–44–3–3(a) (West 2012) (requiring a mens 
rea of “knowingly or intentionally”). 
 59.  Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2284 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 60.  Id. at 2287 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 61.  Id. at 2285 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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In the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Mayer held that 
convictions obtained under Oregon’s first degree burglary statute 
qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA.62 The statute applied 
to unlawful entries into “any booth, vehicle, boat, [and] aircraft,”63 
rather than limiting burglary to entrances into buildings and 
structures.  Still, the Oregon burglary statute  qualified because 
the behavior prohibited leads to “a serious potential risk that [the 
crime] will result in physical injury to another.”64 Judge Kozinski 
noted (while dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) that 
“Oregon prosecutes as burglars people who pose no risk of injury 
to anyone,” and cited an Oregon Supreme Court case affirming a 
burglary conviction for “entering public telephone booths to steal 
change from coin boxes.”65 Though consistent with one line of 
Supreme Court precedent on the ACCA’s Residual Clause – (Sykes 
states that “[t]he sole decision of this Court concerning the reach 
of ACCA’s  residual clause in which risk was not the dispositive 
factor is Begay”66) the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion seems to run 
contrary to the aforementioned dicta in Taylor.67 
In United States v. Johnson,68  the Second Circuit held that 
the Connecticut offense of “rioting at a correctional institution,”69 
which punishes a defendant for, inter alia, “tak[ing] part in . . . 
organized disobedience to the rules and regulations of [a 
correctional] institution,”70 qualifies as a violent felony under the 
ACCA’s Residual Clause. Though organized disobedience could 
encompass hunger strikes, the court wrote that even inciting or 
participating in a hunger strike “involve[s] deliberate and 
purposeful conduct.”71 
And, in the words of Justice Scalia, the Fourth Circuit has 
recently suggested that “Oliver Twist was a violent felon,”72 
 
 62.  560 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 63.  Id. at 959.   
 64.  Mayer, 560 F.3d at 962. 
 65.  Id. at 952 (citing State v. Keys, 419 P.2d 943 (Or. 1966). 
 66.  Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2275. 
 67.  See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990). 
 68.  616 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Derby v. United 
States, 131 S. Ct. 2858 (2011).  
 69.  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a–179b(a) (West 2012). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Johnson, 616 F.3d at 90. 
 72.  Derby v. United States, 131 S. Ct. at 2859  (Scalia, J., dissenting 
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because larceny from the person (defined as theft of money or 
anything worth five dollars or more)73 “does not necessarily 
involve violence, but [does] require[ ] the offender to make 
purposeful, aggressive moves to part the victim from his or her 
property, creating a similar risk of violent confrontation.”74 
What do these cases have in common? Besides the fact that 
certiorari was denied on all three,75 they demonstrate that the 
application of the ACCA’s Residual Clause, even after four 
Supreme Court opinions in four years, is hopelessly muddled and 
may lead to paradoxical results which bestow the label “violent 
felon” upon those who do not deserve it, or withhold it from those 
who do. 
PART III. A RATIONALIST ARGUMENT FOR INDIVIDUALIZING 
SENTENCING. 
In Part III.A I suggest that setting the appropriate sentence 
for a crime is more accurate when more facts about the criminal 
and the crime are known to the sentencing authority, regardless of 
one’s philosophical justification for penal sanctions. Imagine that 
for each crime – not each crime generically, like ‘second degree 
murder’, but for each actual crime, like “Jerry stole $5 from Tom’s 
hand while Tom was standing on the street corner, then ran off,” – 
there is an ideal sentence. 
The sentence must be justified by at least one76 of the 
“legitimate” goals of penal sanctions recognized by the Supreme 
Court: deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.77 
The ideal sentence, then, should deter Jerry (and the population) 
from future mischief, and/or it should punish Jerry in proportion 
to his injuries to society, and/or it should incapacitate him for a 
time such that he will not be able to commit further crimes, and/or 
 
from denial of certiorari). 
 73.  VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-95 (West 2009). 
 74.  United States v. Jarmon, 596 F.3d 228, 232 (4th Cir. 2010) cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 145 (2010). 
 75.  Derby, 131 S. Ct. at 2858; Jarmon, 131 S. Ct. at 145; Mayer v. 
United States, 130 S. Ct. 158 (2009).  
 76.  But see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment does not mandate adoption of any one 
penological theory.”). 
 77.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2016 (2010). 
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it should place him in prison for long enough that he is 
rehabilitated. These four goals may lead to contrary results. For 
instance, this crime may excite little to no moral outrage in the 
retributionist, while a utilitarian may suggest that “making an 
example” out of Jerry will deter many petty thieves. 
Whichever penological goal is preferred by the state, the 
introduction of more facts should not hinder the ability to fashion 
the most appropriate sentence. A retributionist is concerned with 
righting the wrong done to a victim or society. Retribution finds 
its justification in remedying past wrongs, rather than preventing 
future wrongs. It follows, then, that a retributionist could better 
fashion a sentence if she had a more precise understanding of the 
past wrong. Who was the offender? Was there any element of the 
offender’s crime that makes his transgression less culpable?  A 
woman who struck her husband may have been provoked in a way 
that fell short of an affirmative legal defense, but that nonetheless 
makes her less culpable than a woman who struck her husband 
with no provocation. For the retributionist, a verdict of “guilty” or 
“not guilty” and a set of nondescriptive legal elements do not tell 
the whole story. So too for the incapacitationist, who imprisons 
offenders so that they will not cause further harm to society. 
Offenders whose crimes are legally identical may have committed 
those crimes in such a way – or the offenders may have certain 
characteristics – that make it more or less likely that they will 
offend again in the future. And the rehabilitationist, whose goal is 
to prevent habitual offending and “cure” the antisocial tendencies 
of the criminal, is surely more likely to succeed in any such course 
of treatment if more about the criminal and his crime are known 
to the sentencing authority. For those concerned with individual 
deterrence,78 characteristics about the offender and his crime 
would help fashion a sentence that would better deter an offender. 
In each case, a sentencing authority has the opportunity to set a 
sentence that better redresses the harm to society, better deters 
the offender from future harm, better safeguards society from the 
offender’s actions, or better plots the rehabilitative program. 
General deterrence, however, is concerned with deterring 
 
 78.  By “individual deterrence,” I mean “specific deterrence,” which is 
aimed at discouraging the individual offender from committing future crimes, 
rather than the general population from committing the crime. 
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future offenders, rather than the specific offender before the 
Court. The philosophy has been challenged by skeptics who claim 
that the fundamental assumption of general deterrence – that the 
public is aware of crimes and their respective sentences, and make 
cost-benefit decisions on that basis – is flawed.79 One concerned 
with general, population-wide deterrence might instead set the 
same punishment for all offenders who commit legally identical 
crimes, on the theory that setting a uniform sentence for the same 
“harm” – regardless of motive, background, and victim - 
establishes a splendid deterrent.80 But are general deterrers 
better off with mandatory sentencing statutes? Not necessarily. In 
order for general deterrence to be better served by mandatory 
sentencing statutes, the given criminal offense must criminalize a 
narrow range of conduct. If a given offense criminalizes a wide 
range of conduct, then even general deterrers might see the need 
for more particulars before sentencing is passed down. 
Or, if mandatory sentencing statutes are abolished and the 
unlikely worst case scenario results (judges give wildly disparate 
sentences based on their own pet notion of penal sanctions and for 
some reason appellate review of disparate sentences is ineffective), 
then the goal of general deterrence may be met by making each 
trip before a judge the equivalent of penal sanction Russian 
roulette. Chamber 1, rehabilitationist, Chamber 2, specific 
deterrer, Chamber 3, general deterrer, BLAM, serious jail time. If 
a criminal is rational enough to be susceptible to general 
deterrence, then they may be rational enough to avoid penal 
sanction Russian Roulette. 
PART IV. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE 
A. “Death is Different” as the Dividing Line 
The police powers reserved to the state,81 as well as an 
 
 79.  See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in 
the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 
GEO. L.J. 949, 950-54 (2003) (discussing the legal knowledge hurdle and 
collecting scholarship challenging the general deterrence rationale). 
 80.  This is conceding that criminal statutes always describe the same 
“harm” when they measure it in, e.g., dollars stolen. 
 81.  See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding 
the authority of states to enforce compulsory vaccinations laws); Village of 
Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding that zoning 
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originalist reading of the Constitution, theoretically limit the 
ability of the Court to tinker with state sentencing practices. But 
in the last forty years, the Court has used the Eighth Amendment 
to narrow the states’ freedom to punish as they see fit. In Woodson 
v. North Carolina the Court confirmed with one hand that 
“individualizing sentencing determinations . . . [is] simply 
enlightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative,” but 
with the other it “require[d] consideration of the character and 
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the 
particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the 
process of inflicting the penalty of death.” 82 
Woodson’s language was strong, but its limiting principle was 
crisp: the death penalty. The Court has continuously recognized 
that “death is different,”83 and until recently it seemed that the 
line would not be crossed, even though the Court made decisions 
relative to the death penalty that, in principle, should be 
applicable to non-capital cases. For instance, in the 1982 case 
Enmund v. Florida, the Court held that Florida could not execute 
a defendant convicted of murder on accessorial felony-murder 
theories.84 Since the defendant did not kill, attempt to kill, or 
intend to kill, it was impermissible under the Eighth Amendment 
for a state to treat the defendant as it treated the robbers who 
killed.85 This striking decision theoretically undermines the 
vitality of the felony-murder doctrine: the Court stated that the 
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires 
that states measure the culpability of a so-called felon-murderer 
based on his individual conduct.86 Indeed, if Enmund were not 
limited to the death-penalty context, it would be a de facto 
abolition of felony-murder.87 
 
ordinances are within a village’s police power). 
 82.  428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). 
 83.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012); Woodson, 428 U.S. 
at 305 (“The penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of 
imprisonment, however long.”). 
 84.  458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982). 
 85.  Id. at 796, 798.  
 86.  Id. at 798. 
 87.  Though states could still label defendants like Enmund, as felon-
murderers, they would be constitutionally required to sentence such 
defendants based on their conduct. See, e.g., ARK.CODE ANN. § 5–10–
101(a)(1)(B) (2006) (requiring that a death occur in the course of a qualifying 
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The “death is different” line was well-defended by 
conservative members of the Court for a decade or so, but in the 
early nineties fault lines began to show. In 1991, it was only for a 
fractured 5-4 Court that Justice Scalia confirmed “[s]evere,  
mandatory penalties  may  be  cruel,  but  they  are  not  unusual  
in  the  constitutional  sense,  having  been employed  in  various  
forms  throughout  our  Nation’s  history.”88 
B. Now Age is Different, too. 
In the 2010 case Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court 
crossed the “death is different” line.89 Justice Kennedy wrote for a 
5-4 majority that juvenile offenders who do not commit homicide 
may not receive a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.90 
Though the Court has in a few instances overturned noncapital 
sentences on a defendant-by-defendant basis using the so-called 
narrow proportionality principle,91 Graham was the first case in 
which the Court established a broad, categorical rule against the 
imposition of a punishment on a certain class of offender.92 Chief 
Justice Roberts opined that the majority established “a new 
constitutional rule of dubious provenance.”93 Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Alito dissented based on an originalist reading of the 
Eighth Amendment.94 
Graham’s effect, admittedly, is narrow: it applied only to 
juveniles who did not commit homicide, and only to sentences of 
life imprisonment without parole.95 Only 123 prisoners nationwide 
were so sentenced.96 But Graham is notable not for its effect, but 
because it added another clause to the “death is different” line. 
Graham left us with the much less pithy adage that death, and 
life imprisonment without parole as applied to juveniles who do 
not commit homicide, are different. But Graham did not apply 
Woodson’s mandate that certain punishments require 
 
felony). 
 88.  Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994–95 (1991). 
 89.  130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).  
 90.  Id. at 2034.  
 91.  See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 227 (1983).  
 92.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022-23. 
 93.  Id. at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 94.  Id. at 2043-58 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 95.  Id. at 2034. 
 96.  Id. at 2024. 
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individualized sentencing determinations. 
Miller v. Alabama did.97  Decided on June 25, 2012, Miller v. 
Alabama struck yet another blow against mandatory sentencing 
schemes. Miller was consolidated with Jackson v. Hobbs; both 
cases involved 14-year-olds convicted of murder.98 These are the 
facts of Jackson, as set forth in the dissenting opinion of the 
Arkansas Supreme Court: 
Appellant Kuntrell Jackson was barely fourteen on the 
night of the incident that led to his arrest. He was 
walking with an older cousin and friend, Travis Booker 
and Derrick Shields, through . . . [a] housing project . . . 
when the boys began discussing the idea of robbing the 
Movie Magic video store. On the way to Movie 
Magic, Jackson became aware of the fact that Shields was 
carrying a sawed-off .410 gauge shotgun in his coat 
sleeve. When they arrived at the store, Shields and 
Booker went in, but Jackson elected to remain outside by 
the door. Shields pointed the shot gun at the video clerk, 
Laurie Troup, and demanded that she “give up the 
money.” Troup told Shields that she did not have any 
money. A few moments later, Jackson went inside. 
Shields demanded that Troup give up the money five or 
six more times, and each time she refused. After Troup 
mentioned something about calling the police, Shields 
shot her in the face. The three boys then fled to Jackson’s 
house without taking any money.99 
Jackson was tried as an adult and convicted of felony-
murder.100 A sentencing statute mandated a sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole.101 The statute precluded 
consideration of Jackson’s youth, his precise role in the crime, and 
other arguably mitigating circumstances.102 His conviction was 
affirmed on direct appeal in 2004,103 but in 2005 the Supreme 
 
 97.  132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
 98.  Id. at 2463. 
 99.  Jackson v. Norris, 378 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Ark. 2011) (Danielson, J., 
dissenting), rev’d sub. nom. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 100.  Id. at 108 (Danielson, J., dissenting). 
 101.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101(c)(1) (2006). 
 102.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.  
 103.  Jackson v. State, 194 S.W.3d 757, 758 (Ark. 2004). 
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Court decided Roper v. Simmons, and in 2010, Graham v. Florida.  
Roper v. Simmons categorically forbade the execution of any 
offender for a crime committed before the offender’s eighteenth 
birthday.104 Both decisions exempted juveniles from certain types 
of punishment because they were less culpable than adult 
offenders. This categorical rule was justified by scientific research 
indicating that, as compared to adults, juveniles  exhibit “lack of 
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility”; they “are 
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside 
pressures, including peer pressure”; and their characters are ”not 
as well formed.”105 
Holding that the logic of those cases was not “crime-specific,” 
the Court in Miller fashioned a new rule protecting juveniles: 
Mandatory life without parole for juveniles, even those who 
commit homicide, is cruel and unusual.106 But Miller’s importance 
to the fate of mandatory sentencing schemes had more to do with 
a distinction drawn in the majority opinion between cases where 
the Court “categorically bar[s] a penalty” and those where it 
“mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process . . . before 
imposing a particular penalty.”107 
Categorical challenges to a given punishment require that the 
defendant seeking relief provide evidence of national consensus 
(legislative enactments and state practice) regarding the 
sentencing practice.108 Given that a majority of United States 
jurisdictions made a life without parole sentence mandatory for 
juveniles who committed homicide,109 it seemed unlikely that any 
national consensus against that sentencing practice could be 
found. But Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, shouldered 
aside the requirement for national consensus against a given 
sentencing practice by recasting the petitioners’ challenge as one 
to the process of meting out the penalty.110 The decision cites 
several cases for support that there is such a thing as a process-
based challenge under the Eighth Amendment,111 but each one of 
 
 104.  543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). 
 105.  Id. at 569-70.  
 106.  132 S. Ct. at 2475.  
 107.  Id. at 2471.   
 108.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022. 
 109.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471. 
 110.  Id.  
 111.  Id. 
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those cases was decided in the context of the death penalty.112 
Miller casually extends this process-based challenge to youths,113 
ensuring that “[t]here is no clear reason that [this] principle would 
not bar all mandatory sentences for juveniles, or any juvenile 
sentence as harsh as what a similarly situated adult would 
receive.”114 Indeed, there is no clear reason that  this principle 
would not bar all mandatory sentences for any defendants who 
exhibit some characteristic that uniformly mitigates their 
culpability for a crime (e.g., mentally deficient defendants) or 
those who did not pull the trigger in a felony-murder. By holding 
that in process-based challenges, “we have not scrutinized or 
relied in the same way on legislative enactments,” the Miller court 
cast loose the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence from the 
strictures of national consensus.115 
The decision to allow youths to bring process-based challenges 
to their sentences is all the more striking because it was not 
forced. The Court could have obtained the same result without 
such a broad ruling: it could have extended Enmund’s special 
treatment of felon-murderers from the death penalty context to 
the juvenile-life-without-parole context, effectively holding that 
Graham already covers juvenile felon-murderers. Indeed, this 
holding was hinted at by Justice Breyer’s concurrence, which was 
joined by Justice Sotomayor: 
[I]f the State continues to seek a sentence of life without 
the possibility of parole for Kuntrell Jackson, there will 
have to be a determination whether Jackson “kill[ed] or 
intend[ed] to kill” the robbery victim. In my view, without 
such a finding, the Eighth Amendment as interpreted 
 
 112.  See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 67 (1987) (a Nevada statute 
that mandates death penalty for a prison inmate convicted of murder while 
serving a life imprisonment is unconstitutional); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 
U.S. 104, 117 (1982) (remanding Oklahoma capital sentence for consideration 
of mitigating circumstances); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (Ohio 
statute does not allow the sentencer to consider mitigating factors). 
 113.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 (“Our decision . . . mandates only that a 
sentencer follow a certain process” and recognize “that youth matters for 
purposes of meting out the law’s most serious punishments. When both of 
those circumstances have obtained in the past, we have not scrutinized or 
relied in the same way on legislative enactments.”). 
 114.  Id. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 115.  Id. at 2471. 
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in Graham forbids sentencing Jackson to such a sentence, 
regardless of whether its application is mandatory or 
discretionary under state law.116 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence echoes the holding in Graham 
that “[t]he Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without 
parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit 
homicide.”117 What does it mean to commit homicide? The plain 
meaning of “commit homicide” is likely the taking of one human 
life by another. State classifications of “commit homicide” are not 
so clear, and include felony-murders, which rely on the doctrine of 
transferred intent to supply the requisite mens rea for the non-
triggerman defendant.118 But if Graham’s holding meant for the 
plain meaning of homicide to control, then non-triggerman felon-
murderers are already protected by Graham. This reading is 
supported by the Court’s repeated reference to “juvenile 
offender[s] who did not kill or intend to kill.”119 Indeed, the 
opposite holding – that state classifications of homicide control – 
leads to a paradoxical result. In Arkansas, which has a felony-
murder statute, Jackson’s conduct is deemed homicide and a life 
without parole sentence is (under current law) constitutional, so 
long as it is not imposed mandatorily.120 In Kentucky, which does 
not have a felony-murder statute, Jackson’s conduct would not be 
a homicide offense.121 In order to avoid the absurdity of Eighth 
Amendment rights changing over a 100-mile stretch of I-55, the 
plain meaning of homicide may control.122 
Death is different, and now children too. Punishment by 
punishment, characteristic by characteristic, the Court is 
 
 116.  Id. at 2475 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 117.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
 118.  See, e.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2476 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(discussing the doctrine). 
 119.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027. 
 120.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (“[A] judge or jury must have the 
opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the 
harshest possible penalty for juveniles. . . . [T]he mandatory sentencing 
schemes before us violate this principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.”).  
 121.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (LexisNexis 2008).   
 122.  Note, however, that Graham’s analysis of national consensus 
regarding life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders arrived at 
the 123 figure (for individuals serving life without parole sentences for non-
homicide crimes) by disincluding juvenile felon-murderers. 130 S. Ct. at 2035. 
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establishing that while individualized sentencing was once no 
more than enlightened policy, it is now a constitutional 
imperative. 
PART V. WHY MANDATORY SENTENCING SCHEMES WILL PERSIST. 
Why will mandatory sentencing schemes persist? There are 
both sound and unsound reasons. Beginning with the latter, it 
appears that passing a mandatory sentencing scheme may be 
politically expedient. Those who are most directly affected by a 
penal sanction – i.e., criminals - are rarely politically powerful or 
widely popular. This is especially so for so-called malum in se 
crimes. If a politician proposes that every sexual offender receive a 
mandatory two year enhancement on top of whatever already 
exists, then the parties most interested in opposing the statute are 
likely sexual offenders. Though some concerned citizens may point 
out that, for instance, urinating in public may qualify one as a 
“sex offender,”123 public discourse may not reach a level of detail 
such that the unintended consequences of the bill are discussed. 
The Economist describes the mechanism by which sex offense laws 
become harsher and harsher: 
Sex-offender registries are popular. Rape and child 
molestation are terrible crimes that can traumatise their 
victims for life. All parents want to protect their children 
from sexual predators, so politicians can nearly always 
win votes by promising curbs on them. Those who object 
can be called soft on child-molesters, a label most 
politicians would rather avoid. This creates a ratchet 
effect. Every lawmaker who wants to sound tough on sex 
offenders has to propose a law tougher than the one 
enacted by the last politician who wanted to sound tough 
on sex offenders.124 
Similarly, ACCA, for all its rounding errors, applies only to a 
felon arrested with a firearm who has three arguably violent 
 
 123.  See Sex Laws: Unjust and Ineffective, THE ECONOMIST, Aug 6, 2009, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/14164614?story_id=14164614 
&source=hptextfeature; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 314 (West 1999).    
 124.  Sex Laws: Unjust and Ineffective, THE ECONOMIST, Aug 6, 2009, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/14164614?story_id=14164614& 
source=hptextfeature. 
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felonies or serious drug offenses on his record.125 
Of course, not all of those who object to vesting sentencing 
discretion in judges are demagogues. Concerns about irregular 
sentencing (disparate sentences for similar crimes) as well as 
outlier judges (i.e., judges who are far too lenient or far too harsh 
with their sentences) are not irrational. However, these concerns 
can be addressed by adopting a system similar to the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines. 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are the product of the 
United States Sentencing Commission, an independent agency of 
the judicial branch created by the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984.126 The guidelines were originally conceived of as mandatory, 
but in United States v. Booker127 and United States v. Fanfan, 
decided in January 2005, the Supreme Court held that the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment 
right to a trial by jury. Since the guidelines obliged judges to make 
factual findings that may increase a defendant’s sentence above 
what would be permitted by a jury’s verdict, the Court determined 
that mandatory application of the guidelines was 
unconstitutional.128 The Court instead made them mandatorily 
advisory, which means that judges must meditate on what 
sentences would be under the guidelines, but are ultimately free 
to depart from that figure.129 The Supreme Court decided that 
appellate review of district court sentences outside the advisory 
guidelines would be conducted under the “unreasonableness” 
standard.130 
In short, a mandatory sentencing scheme has been replaced 
by an advisory scheme which compels the judge to take into 
account what similar offenders have received as sentences for the 
same crime in the past, yet allows for departure from the 
guidelines if the judge deems the departure necessary. A sentence 
outside of the Guidelines leads to a review for unreasonableness. 
Have federal sentences become, as a result, too lenient? 
Apparently not. A 2009 study demonstrated that above-
 
 125.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006).  
 126.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (2006).  
 127.  543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 128.  Id. at 245. 
 129.  Id. at 246.  
 130.  Id. at  261. 
WRAY DESKTOPPED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2013  4:23 PM 
2013] MANDATORY SENTENCING STATUTES 163 
Guidelines-range sentences are imposed at a rate double that of 
the rate before Booker.131 Even while the Guidelines were in 
effect, the mandatory minimums did not have the effect that 
“sentencing hawks” might have preferred: that is, reigning in 
liberal judges who gave squishy, lenient sentences.132 
Commentators instead note that the mandatory minimums 
frustrate Republican political appointees (with political party 
being an admittedly imperfect proxy for whether a judge is being 
tough on crime) at the same level or a higher rate than the general 
population of federal judges.133 
Have federal sentences become, as a result, too harsh? It is 
theoretically possible that releasing federal judges from the 
strictures of a mandatory sentencing scheme has permitted them 
to hand down unforgiving sentences. But as one commentator 
noted, it is unlikely: “Because legislatures tend to write high 
statutory maxima into the criminal code—to take account of the 
worst possible offense within each classification—the limitation 
placed on judicial discretion by the [guideline] is seldom 
confining.”134 And in any case, the switch from a mandatory 
sentencing scheme to an advisory scheme provides a corrective 
mechanism defendants did not have before: appellate review of 
their sentence. Prior to the Booker decision, appellate review of 
sentences within the Guidelines was unavailable except in cases of 
clear error or unconstitutionality.135 
 
 131.  Mark T. Doerr, Note, Not Guilty? Go to Jail. The Unconstitutionality 
of Acquitted-Conduct Sentencing, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235, 236 
(2009). 
 132.  See, e.g., Mark H. Allenbaugh, Who's Afraid of the Federal 
Judiciary? Why Congress' Fear of Judicial Sentencing Discretion May 
Undermine a Generation of Reform, CHAMPION, June 2003, at 7.  
 133.  See, e.g., David M. Zlotnick, The Future of Federal Sentencing Policy: 
Learning Lessons from Republican Judicial Appointees in the Guidelines Era, 
79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 76 n.256 (2008); David M. Zlotnick, The War Within the 
War on Crime: The Congressional Assault on Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 
57 SMU L. REV. 211, 227-28 (2004); David M. Zlotnick, Shouting into the 
Wind: District Court Judges and Federal Sentencing Policy, 9 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 645, 646 (2004); Todd David Peterson, Congressional 
Investigations of Federal Judges, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1, 13-20 (2004).  
 134.  Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: 
A Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1445 
n.19 (1997). 
 135.  Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) (“Before the Guidelines 
system, a federal criminal sentence within statutory limits was, for all 
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Still, any sentencing scheme which vests discretion in judges, 
and subjects that discretion to review by judges, arguably 
attenuates democratic influence on criminal sentencing. Judges, 
even those that are elected, are theoretically less responsive to 
public opinion than are legislators. But that is not to say that they 
do not alter their sentences based on popular opinion. A recent 
study of Washington State judges demonstrates that judges 
appear to respond to political forces when issuing sentences: 
“Whether judges respond to political pressure is an important 
question occupying social scientists. We present evidence that 
Washington State judges respond to such pressure by sentencing 
serious crimes more severely.”136 
CONCLUSION 
Given the potential for mandatory sentencing statutes to err 
in fashioning the correct sentence for defendants, sentencing 
discretion should be vested in judges. Without having to invest 
scarce resources in separate sentencing hearings or further fact-
finding, vesting judges with sentencing discretion will result in a 
more particularized determination of culpability. And perhaps, 
with our “object all sublime, [we] shall achieve in time – to let the 
punishment fit the crime.”137 
 
 
practical purposes, not reviewable on appeal.”); see also KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. 
CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
9 (1998) (“For over two hundred years, there was virtually no appellate 
review of the federal trial judge’s exercise of sentencing discretion.”). 
 136.  Carlos Berdejó & Noam Yuchtman, Crime, Punishment, and Politics: 
An Analysis of Political Cycles in Criminal Sentencing (Loyola-LA Legal 
Studies Paper No. 2012-50), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=219460.  
 137.  GILBERT, MY OBJECT ALL SUBLIME, supra note 1.   
